Post by Paddy by Grace on Sept 1, 2008 16:46:44 GMT -7
www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/opinion/story.html?id=363b4a0c-b009-4549-80dd-75eb43a2a994
It is becoming increasingly likely that Israel will attack Iran's nuclear facilities in the next few months. Indeed, over the past few weeks, signs of an impending strike have been widely reported, with the Israeli government itself fuelling much of the speculation.
While much of the recent media commentary has revolved around the question of whether Israel has the military capability to undertake such a difficult mission, this emphasis misses the larger point, which is that an Israeli strike may set off a chain reaction that could prove difficult to control.
Assuming that the Israeli Air Force attacks -- regardless of whether or not the raid is successful -- the Iranian response will be the key to determining how serious the crisis becomes. Thus, how Tehran retaliates will result in either a tense -- but ultimately limited -- crisis, one where threats will be issued and warnings made but military action will be measured and somewhat predictable, or conversely, in a rapidly escalating crisis that might threaten the stability of the entire region, and may result in the total devastation of some states.
The former scenario is easier to envisage. Under it, after the Israeli strike, Iran's leaders would issue numerous threats, but in the end Tehran would limit its military activities to sponsorship of terrorism through its regional proxies (i.e. Hamas and Hezbollah) and the stepping up of attacks against American forces in Iraq. In addition, Iran would likely attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, which could cause panic on world oil markets.
While such actions would no doubt cause considerable casualties and damages (any attempt to close the strait will likely push oil above $200 a barrel), it is unlikely that they would cause the crisis to deteriorate further. Thus, after some time, acts of terrorism against Israel would gradually diminish, and while Iran has the ability to seriously threaten American forces in Iraq, it is unlikely to do so, as any such attempt would set the stage for a larger confrontation with Washington, a development not in Tehran's interest.
As a result, within a few months, the region would settle into its "normal" pattern -- albeit one that will remain very unsettled for some time, and one where the U.S. will be widely vilified (as it will be blamed in the Arab world for assisting Israel, regardless of whether or not it does).
The second scenario, however, is much more unpredictable, and involves several uncertainties. According to this model, Iran would retaliate against Israel using ballistic missiles -- a possibility, it should be noted, that it has explicitly warned of on several occasions. While Israel has a missile defence system, its capabilities have never been tested in war (it was of no use against the short-range rockets that Hezbollah fired in 2006), and it is unlikely that it would successfully intercept all the missiles Iran would launch.
The first uncertainty involves the targets Iran strikes. Would it attack strategic targets like petroleum facilities or air bases?
n this case there would be significant physical damage but limited Israeli casualties. Or would it strike major population centres (such as Tel Aviv or Haifa) or the country's nuclear facility, in which case, casualties would be extensive?
In the former scenario, Israel's retaliatory strike can be expected to be somewhat similar, as the air force would mount a raid against comparable Iranian targets. In the event of the latter, though, Israel's retaliation can be expected to be heavy, perhaps raising the spectre of a counter-attack utilizing some form of WMD (the higher the number of Israeli casualties, the greater the likelihood of a non-conventional response). In this scenario, both countries would suffer significant casualties and damages, and their respective recoveries would be long and difficult.
A second uncertainty involves the type of warhead Iran would arm its missiles with. Would they be conventionally armed, in which case the number of Israeli casualties would depend on the targets hit (as discussed above)? Or would they be armed with a chemical or biological agent, in which case Israeli casualties could be massive? Once again, Israel's retaliation would likely follow the Iranian lead, with the latter scenario resulting in a major nuclear counter-strike.
Given these dire scenarios, it is clear that the initial use of force by Israel may trigger a catastrophic confrontation. Thus, the preferred solution remains a diplomatic one, although given Iran's intransigence and unwillingness to give up its nuclear program, it seems unlikely that the negotiations that have been under way for years (and which recently resumed with U.S. involvement) will suddenly succeed.
In sum, an Israeli strike against Iran now appears almost inevitable. The effects of this strike are impossible to predict, but it is not difficult to imagine a scenario where the results could be devastating. In the long term, the entire regime that has been created to contain nuclear proliferation, including both treaties (the NPT) and institutions (the IAEA), will need to be fundamentally transformed and strengthened to ensure that the present situation cannot occur again. Unfortunately, though, that prospect offers little comfort at present.
It is becoming increasingly likely that Israel will attack Iran's nuclear facilities in the next few months. Indeed, over the past few weeks, signs of an impending strike have been widely reported, with the Israeli government itself fuelling much of the speculation.
While much of the recent media commentary has revolved around the question of whether Israel has the military capability to undertake such a difficult mission, this emphasis misses the larger point, which is that an Israeli strike may set off a chain reaction that could prove difficult to control.
Assuming that the Israeli Air Force attacks -- regardless of whether or not the raid is successful -- the Iranian response will be the key to determining how serious the crisis becomes. Thus, how Tehran retaliates will result in either a tense -- but ultimately limited -- crisis, one where threats will be issued and warnings made but military action will be measured and somewhat predictable, or conversely, in a rapidly escalating crisis that might threaten the stability of the entire region, and may result in the total devastation of some states.
The former scenario is easier to envisage. Under it, after the Israeli strike, Iran's leaders would issue numerous threats, but in the end Tehran would limit its military activities to sponsorship of terrorism through its regional proxies (i.e. Hamas and Hezbollah) and the stepping up of attacks against American forces in Iraq. In addition, Iran would likely attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, which could cause panic on world oil markets.
While such actions would no doubt cause considerable casualties and damages (any attempt to close the strait will likely push oil above $200 a barrel), it is unlikely that they would cause the crisis to deteriorate further. Thus, after some time, acts of terrorism against Israel would gradually diminish, and while Iran has the ability to seriously threaten American forces in Iraq, it is unlikely to do so, as any such attempt would set the stage for a larger confrontation with Washington, a development not in Tehran's interest.
As a result, within a few months, the region would settle into its "normal" pattern -- albeit one that will remain very unsettled for some time, and one where the U.S. will be widely vilified (as it will be blamed in the Arab world for assisting Israel, regardless of whether or not it does).
The second scenario, however, is much more unpredictable, and involves several uncertainties. According to this model, Iran would retaliate against Israel using ballistic missiles -- a possibility, it should be noted, that it has explicitly warned of on several occasions. While Israel has a missile defence system, its capabilities have never been tested in war (it was of no use against the short-range rockets that Hezbollah fired in 2006), and it is unlikely that it would successfully intercept all the missiles Iran would launch.
The first uncertainty involves the targets Iran strikes. Would it attack strategic targets like petroleum facilities or air bases?
n this case there would be significant physical damage but limited Israeli casualties. Or would it strike major population centres (such as Tel Aviv or Haifa) or the country's nuclear facility, in which case, casualties would be extensive?
In the former scenario, Israel's retaliatory strike can be expected to be somewhat similar, as the air force would mount a raid against comparable Iranian targets. In the event of the latter, though, Israel's retaliation can be expected to be heavy, perhaps raising the spectre of a counter-attack utilizing some form of WMD (the higher the number of Israeli casualties, the greater the likelihood of a non-conventional response). In this scenario, both countries would suffer significant casualties and damages, and their respective recoveries would be long and difficult.
A second uncertainty involves the type of warhead Iran would arm its missiles with. Would they be conventionally armed, in which case the number of Israeli casualties would depend on the targets hit (as discussed above)? Or would they be armed with a chemical or biological agent, in which case Israeli casualties could be massive? Once again, Israel's retaliation would likely follow the Iranian lead, with the latter scenario resulting in a major nuclear counter-strike.
Given these dire scenarios, it is clear that the initial use of force by Israel may trigger a catastrophic confrontation. Thus, the preferred solution remains a diplomatic one, although given Iran's intransigence and unwillingness to give up its nuclear program, it seems unlikely that the negotiations that have been under way for years (and which recently resumed with U.S. involvement) will suddenly succeed.
In sum, an Israeli strike against Iran now appears almost inevitable. The effects of this strike are impossible to predict, but it is not difficult to imagine a scenario where the results could be devastating. In the long term, the entire regime that has been created to contain nuclear proliferation, including both treaties (the NPT) and institutions (the IAEA), will need to be fundamentally transformed and strengthened to ensure that the present situation cannot occur again. Unfortunately, though, that prospect offers little comfort at present.